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Beef Hormones Foster Animosity and Not
Growth: An Analysis of the World Trade
Organization Solving the United States' and
European Communities' Beef Hormone
Dispute
Nicole C. Lloyd*
This article is current as of January 2006. The ultimate decision by
the World Trade Organization is scheduled to be released in October
of 2006.'

I.

Introduction

The United States ("U.S.") and the European Communities 2 ("EC")
are at odds regarding European legislation banning American beef
imports because of potential ill effects of natural and synthetic hormones
used for growth promotion purposes.3 The U.S. was, and continues to
be, angered that its meats cannot be exported to Europe because of the
EC's ban against hormones used for growth promotion purposes among

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2007; B.A., University of California, San Diego (UCSD), 2004.
1. Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States-Continued
Suspension of Obligations in the European Communities-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS/320/9 (Jan. 23, 2006).
2. The European Communities is the legal name of the European Union in the
World Trade Organization. The countries under the European Communities umbrella
are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. See The World Trade Organization, Member Information: The European
Communities and the
WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/countries-e/
european communitiese.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
3. See Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meats and
Meat Products (Hormones), 3.1-.6, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) (adopted Feb.
13, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report].
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cattle. 4 As a result, the U.S. has lost millions of dollars due to the
unavailability of the European market for U.S. beef and beef
byproducts.
The EC's directive banning hormones did not conform to sanitary
policies to which World Trade Organization ("WTO") Members must
adhere, thereby violating WTO policy.6 After a Panel Report,7 an
Appellate Body Report,8 and Binding Arbitration, 9 the WTO's Dispute
Settlement Body' ° gave the EC fifteen months to repeal the legislation
that violated WTO policy.'
The EC, however, did not repeal its
legislation in the fifteen-month timeframe.12 In 1999, the WTO granted
the U.S. the ability to suspend concessions, which allowed the U.S. to
4. See generally First Written Submission of the United States of America, United
States-Continued Suspension of Obligationsin the EC-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320,
(Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_
Enforcement/DisputeSettlement/WTO/Dispute_SettlementListings/asset upload file3
317903.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Submission].
5. The EC's legislation was found to impair the U.S. at a rate of $116.8 million per
year. See Recourse to Arbitration, European Communities-MeasuresConcerningMeats
and Meat Products (Hormones), 83, WT/DS26/ARB, (July 12, 1999) [hereinafter
Recourse to Arbitration].
6. WTO Members must follow the guidelines of the WTO Agreement on
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. See The World Trade Organization,
The WTO Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/spse/spsagre.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement]
(last visited Oct. 21, 2006). Not adhering to the guidelines means that a Member is
violating WTO policy, including the SPS Agreement. See id.
7. See Panel Report, supra note 3.
8. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted
Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report].
9. See Arbitration Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meats
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13 (May 29, 1998) [hereinafter
Arbitration Report].
10. Settling disputes is the responsibility of the Dispute Settlement Body (the
General Council in another guise), which consists of all WTO members. The
Dispute Settlement Body has the sole authority to establish "panels" of experts
to consider the case, and to accept or reject the panels' findings or the results of
an appeal. It monitors the implementation of the rulings and recommendations,
and has the power to authorize retaliation when a country does not comply with
a ruling.
The World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/displ1e.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2006) [hereinafter Understandingthe WTO].
11. See Arbitration Report, supra note 9, XLVIII. The Appellate Body and Panel
Reports were formally adopted on February 13, 1998. Id.
12. The U.S. was granted the suspension of concessions because the EC did not
repeal its legislation in the fifteen month time frame. See Recourse to Arbitration, supra
note 5, 1; see Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Article 22, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
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implement retaliatory sanctions.1 3 Those sanctions counteracted the
4
impairment the U.S. experienced due to the EC's hormone legislation.'
The U.S.'s retaliatory sanctions will remain in effect until the
disputed measures are repealed or modified to conform to WTO policy.15
After more than five years of such sanctions, however, the EC requested
consultations with the U.S. in which it asserted that the U.S. "should
have removed its retaliatory measures since the EC has removed the
measures found to be WTO-inconsistent[.]"' 16 The EC, the U.S., and
17
third party countries had their first Panel meeting in September 2005.18
This meeting was historic because it was the first time the WTO allowed
19
the general public to witness proceedings.

This current issue can be reviewed in two ways: either by focusing
on how the EC scientifically justifies its new measure, or by examining
the procedural steps to ascertain which party in a dispute determines
when an offending party complies with WTO policies and procedures.
There is no straightforward WTO regulation that specifically establishes
who decides if a previously violating Member 2° has repealed improper
legislation, thereby making revocation of the suspension of concessions
necessary. 2' Not only is this topic important to future WTO cases
because it will likely spark an amendment to rules of dispute settlement,
but it also demonstrates to the public how the WTO operates.
This Comment analyzes the procedural measures that may be
available to the U.S. and EC based on various interpretations of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of

Disputes22 ("Dispute Settlement Understanding") while incorporating the
13. See Recourse to Arbitration, supra note 5, 84
14. See id. 83.
15. See id. 39.
16. See Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United StatesContinued Suspension of Obligations in the European Communities-HormonesDispute,
WT/DS320/1 (Nov. 8, 2004) [hereinafter EC Request for Consultations]. This is a selfasserted claim by the EC and has not been examined by a Panel. See id.
17. Relevant third parties are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Chinese Taipei,
India, Mexico, New Zealand, and Norway. See infra notes 135-148.
18. See The World Trade Organization, United States-Continued Suspension of
Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/
cases e/ds320_e.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
19. See Communication from the Chairman of the Panels, United States-Continued
Suspension of Obligations in the European Communities-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS/320/8 (Aug. 2, 2005).
20. A violating Member is the Member who has breached WTO policy. In this
Comment, the violating Member is the EC.
21. See First Written Submission by the European Communities, United StatesContinued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, 85, WT/DS320,
(July 11, 2005) available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/september/
tradoc 124677.pdf [hereinafter EC Submission]; see U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 6.
22. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12.
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doctrine of good faith. This Comment emphasizes that good faith is an
important element of the WTO foundation even after the harshest
punishment 23 has been set forth. Part II describes the history of this
dispute, which dates back over a decade. Part II also identifies why the
U.S. brought the initial dispute to the WTO and examines the outcome of
this initial dispute. Part III presents the EC's argument on the new
dispute surrounding the procedural issues in the process of postsuspension of concessions claims, and analyzes why the EC believes its
Part III also presents a
new ban satisfies WTO obligations.
counterargument to the U.S.'s position. Part IV examines the current
dispute as a procedural event while emphasizing the need for good faith
in dispute settlement situations. Part V suggests what the future
implications could be of the Panel's decisions, as well as the effect of
transparency in the WTO dispute settlement process. Part VI serves as a
concise conclusion.
II.

History of the Dispute

The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures 24 ("SPS Agreement") governs basic health and safety concerns
regarding food safety and animal health standards.25 It sets the minimum
requirements; individual countries, however, may establish higher
thresholds for food safety and animal health standards if supported by
scientific justification.26
Disagreements between WTO member nations are governed by the
Settlement
Dispute
Body 27 under the
Settlement
Dispute
2 8 Instead of unilaterally determining whether another
Understanding.
Member has violated WTO policy, Members who believe another
Member is violating trade rules may bring a claim multilaterally to the
Dispute Settlement Body.29
A.

The EC's Legislation Banning Hormones

In 1981, the EC banned imports of meat and meat products from
cattle that had been given certain hormones for growth promotion
23. The harshest punishment is the suspension of concessions, which allows a
Member to implement retaliatory sanctions. The suspension of concessions is a last
resort measure. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 22.8.
24. The SPS Agreement became effective on Jan. 1, 1995. The SPS Agreement is a
part of the treaty that established the WTO. See SPS Agreement, supra note 6.
25. See id.
26. See id. art. 3.3.
27. See Understandingthe WTO, supra note 10.
28. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12.
29. See Understandingthe WTO, supra note 10.
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purposes. 30 There were three directives issued by the EC against bovine
imports with these hormones-first in July 1981, then in March 1988,
and finally in May 1988. 3'
The July 1981 order prohibited substances with hormonal and
thyrostatic actions 32 from being administered to farm animals. 33 The EC
believed that humans could suffer adverse health affects if they
consumed the meat of animals treated with those hormones.3 4 The
directive banned domestic and imported meats from the European market
if any of the banned hormones were administered to the animal. 35 The
directive had two exceptions. 36 The first exception was for substances
administered by a veterinarian and used for "therapeutic or zootechnical
purposes. 37 The second exception permitted the use of five of the six
contested hormones 38 until a "detailed
examination of the effects of these
39
substances could be carried out."
March 1988's directive removed those exceptions and resulted in an
increase in the number of permanently banned hormones. 40
This
41
directive included prohibiting natural hormones for "growth promotion
or fattening purposes. 42 It prohibited synthetic hormones 43 for any
30. The certain hormones are: oestradiol 170, progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone
acetate, zeranol, or melengestrol acetate. The first three hormones are naturally occurring
hormones; the last three hormones are synthetic hormones. See Appellate Body Report,
supra note 8,
2. In cattle, oestradiol 1713, when combined with progesterone or
testosterone, "improve[s] their rate of weight gain and their efficiency of conversion of
feed into edible tissues." World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations, Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives Fiftysecond Meeting Summary and Conclusions, Feb. 2-11, 1999, 11, available at
http://www.who.int//pcs/jecfa/summary_52.pdf Trenbolone acetate mimics testosterone,
zeranol mimics estradiol, and melegestrol acetate mimics progesterone. See U.S. Dep't
of Agric., Foreign Agric. Serv., A Primer on Beef Hormones, Feb. 24, 1999,
http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/policy/hormone2.html.
31. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 99 2-3.
32. A thyrostatic action suppresses thyroid function.
Thyroid hormones help
regulate growth and metabolism. The CancerWEB Project, Online Medical Dictionary,
http://cancerweb.ncl.ac.uk/cgi-bin/omd?thyrostatic (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
33. Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 3.
34. See Panel Report, supra note 3, 2.26.
35. Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 9 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. Except as otherwise noted in this Comment, all of the EC's legislation
banning the hormones at issue allows meat products to be ;mported if the hormones were
used for therapeutic or zootechnical purposes. See generally id.
38. The hormones are: oestradiol 17, progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone acetate,
zeranol. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. 4.
41. Oestradiol 1713, progesterone, and testosterone.
42. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, T 4. Fattening purposes mean that
there will be more meat per cow at slaughter, and it is economically more efficient for
beef production. See World Health Organization, supra note 30, at 11.
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purpose. 4 Included in this directive was an explicit and strict prohibition
of importation of meat and meat byproducts that were given these
hormones from third party countries.45 Finally, the directive of May
1988 established specific conditions allowing the trade of meat from
animals that were treated
with the banned hormones for "therapeutic or
46
zoological purposes.,

Those three directives were repealed,47 and effective July 1997,48 a
new directive replaced the previous directives. 49 That new directive
continued prohibiting hormones or other substances that had a thyrostatic
action to farm animals.5 ° It also maintained the proscription against
selling and importing meat and meat byproducts 5from animals that were
fed or injected with any of the banned hormones. '
B.

Why the U.S. Brought the InitialDispute to the WTO

52
The U.S. claimed that the EC directive banning hormones
administered for growth purposes was "inconsistent with the SPS
Agreement., 53 Furthermore, the U.S. argued that the ban was related to
sanitary measures under the SPS Agreement and that the directives:

[D]irectly and indirectly affected international trade; were not based
on an assessment of risk ... ; were maintained without a sufficient
scientific evidence ... ; were not justified as a "provisional"
measure...; were not applied only to the extent necessary to protect
human life or health and were more trade-restrictive than required to
achieve the appropriate level of sanitary protection; ...constituted a
disguised restriction on international trade .... 54
The U.S. further asserted that the EC's directive treated American
imports "less favourably than domestic production" 55 and that "the

measures were 'applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
43.
44.

Trenbolone acetate and zeranol.
See Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 4.

45.
46.
47.
48.

See
See
See
See

49.

See Appellate Body Report, supra note 8,

50.
51.

See id.
See id.

id.
id.
id.
id.

5.

5.

52. Oestradiol 170, progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone acetate, zeranol, or
melengestrol acetate. See Panel Report, supra note 3, 3.1.
53. Id.
54. Id. 3.2.
55. Id. 3.3
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56

C. The Outcome of the Dispute
57
The Panel Report concluded that the EC "acted inconsistently"
with the SPS Agreement mandates because sanitary measures were "not
based on a risk assessment." 58 The Panel also declared that the directives
resulted in "discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade" 59 by "adopting arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels
of sanitary protection[,], 60 thus acting contrary with the requirements of
the SPS Agreement. 61 It also found noncompliance with the SPS
Agreement because the directive dictating the EC's sanitary measures
were "not based on existing international standards ' 62 and had no
scientific justification.6 3 The Panel recommended that the EC "bring its
measure in dispute into conformity with its obligations under the [SPS
Agreement][.]" 64

D. Amendments to the Dispute
The EC and U.S. appealed the Panel Report's findings.65 Although
the Appellate Body "uph[e]ld, moditlied], and reverse[d], 66 certain
findings and conclusions of the Panel Report,67 the Appellate Body
ultimately "uph[e]ld[] the Panel's conclusion that the SPS Agreement...
applie[d] to measures that were enacted before the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement but remain[ed] in force thereafter[y.], 68 The Appellate
Body recommended conforming the EC measures in order to comply
with WTO Members' obligations under the SPS Agreement.6 9
In March of 1998, the EC notified the Dispute Settlement Body that
71
70
as a WTO Member.
"it intended to fulfill its obligations"
56. Id. (quoting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX).
57. Panel Report, supra note 3, 9.1(i).

58.

Id.

59.

See id.

60.

See id.

61.

See id.

9.1(ii).
9.1.

62. Panel Report, supra note 3, 9. 1(iii).
63. See id.
64. See id. 9.2.
65. See Appellate Body Report, supra note 8, 1.
66. See id. 254.
67. See id.
68. Id. 253(d). The EC's measures were enacted before the application of the SPS
Agreement and remained in force after the SPS Agreement was promulgated. See id. TT
2-5.
69.

See id.

70.

Arbitration Report, supra note 9,

255.

I.
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Subsequently, the EC informed the Dispute Settlement Body that it
began examining "the options for compliance with a view to
implementation in as short a period of time as possible, and that it would
require a reasonable period of time for this process. 72 The EC and U.S.
tried to reach an agreement on a reasonable time for implementation of
compliance measures.73
The EC lobbied for a reasonable period of four years 74; two years
would be dedicated to risk assessment, and the remaining two years for
legislation.7 5 The U.S., however, asserted that a mere ten months would
be a reasonable period for implementing the Dispute Settlement Body's
ruling.76 The U.S. contended that ten months was sufficient to remove
the measure at issue and make legislative changes that would conform
with the Dispute Settlement Body's recommendations.7 7
Since there was disagreement regarding what constituted a
reasonable period of time, the EC requested that binding arbitration
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding determine that issue.78 The
Dispute Settlement Understanding provides that under binding
arbitration, "the reasonable period of time to implement panel or
Appellate Body recommendations should not exceed 15 months from the
date of adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report., 79 The arbitrator
determined that fifteen months from the date of adoption of both reports
was sufficient in this case.8 °
E. Retaliatory Sanctions by the U.S. againstthe ECfor Failureto
Abide by the Panel Report, Appellate Body Report, and Binding
Arbitration
In May of 1999, at the expiration of the prescribed fifteen month
time limit imposed by the arbitrator, the U.S. requested that the Dispute
Settlement Body authorize it to implement trade tariffs on EC imports
because the latter was unable to complete implantation of the rulings. 8'
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. II.
74. See id. V.
75. See id. At the oral hearing, the European Communities reduced its reasonable
time to thirty-nine months. Two years would still be dedicated to risk assessment, and
the subsequent fifteen months for "any necessary legislative action thereafter." Id.
76. See id. XV.
77. See id.
78. See Arbitration Report, supranote 9, II.
79. See id. XXIII (quoting Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 21.3).
80. See Arbitration Report, supra note 9, XLVIII. The Appellate Body and Panel
Reports were formally adopted on Feb. 13, 1998. Id.
81. See Recourse to Arbitration, supra note 5, 1. The U.S. is allowed to request
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The U.S. was essentially asking for permission to direct U.S. Customs
"to impose duties in excess of [WTO] bound rates" 82 on certain imports,
the total not surpassing $202 million . The Dispute Settlement Body
denied the U.S.'s request and referred the issue of retaliatory sanctions to
binding arbitration.
The arbitrators' role is to ascertain the quantitative aspect of the
level of suspension and ensure that it is "equivalent to the level of
nullification and impairment" 85 caused to the U.S. as a result of the EC's
legislation.86 After determining a value, the U.S. could then decide
which items would receive additional tariffs, as long as the total trade
value did "not exceed the amount of trade impairment [found by the
arbitrators] [],87

The U.S. claimed the hormone ban impaired its exports because the
ban on high quality beef treated with the six contested hormones resulted
in a loss of access to the European market.88 Similarly, the U.S. alleged
that edible beef offal was included in the EC's ban.8 9 Conversely, the EC
contended that the U.S. overestimated the restrictions' effects on
potential exports. 90
The arbitrators found that the "total amount of nullification and
impairment caused by the ban on U.S. exports of HQB[high quality beef]
to be $32,664,776. ' ' 91 They found that impairment to potential exports of
edible beef offal amounted to $90,367,391 .92 The arbitrators concluded
that the U.S. could suspend the application of tariff concessions to the
EC, allowing the
U.S. to implement retaliatory sanctions of $116.8
93
million per year.

sanctions pursuant to Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Id.
82. Id. 113.
83. Id.
84. See id. 2.
85. Id. 20 (emphasis in original).
86. See id.
87. See id. 21.
88. See id. 7 24.
89. See id. 25. Beef offal consists of: brains, head meat, cheek meat, lips, salivary
glands, tongue, weasand, sweetbreads, heart, liver, rumen, honeycomb, bible tripe,
kidney, pancreas glands, small intestines, large intestines, testicles, pizzle, back strap,
tunic tissue, skirt sinew, flexor tendon, Achilles tendon, and oxtail. See U.S. Meat Export
Federation, International Meat Manual-Beef http://www.usmef.org/IMM/IMMbeef/

9_IMMBeefOffal.pdf. (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
90. See Recourse to Arbitration, supra note 5, 31-33.
91. Id. 65.
92. Id. 71. Take this figure and subtract five percent from it to determine the
amount of impairment to edible beef offal for human consumption. Five percent is
estimated to be for pet food, and the EC's legislation does not apply to pet food. The
resulting number is $84,095,731. Id. 75,78.
93. Id. T$ 83-84.
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The $116.8 million tariff concession is only a "temporary measure
of last resort" 94 and should be applied only until the EC fully implement
the Dispute Settlement Body's recommendations or until a "mutually
agreed solution is obtained., 95 The temporary suspension of concessions
is allowed only until the disputed measures are conformed to WTO
rules.96 The suspension of concessions is a last resort measure and is
implemented
only
when
the
Dispute
Settlement
Body's
97
implemented.
be
to
fail
recommendations
III.

The New Dispute

A.

The EC's Argument

The EC alleges that the U.S. is wrong in continuing import
sanctions against EC imports. 98 Accordingly, the EC avers that it has
99
complied with WTO measures by removing the improper sanctions.
The EC asserts that the U.S. is acting against WTO policies and rules
under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, and therefore, violates the
standards and procedures by acting unilaterally and not multilaterally. 100
The EC maintains that the U.S.'s continued suspension, in spite of
the EC's compliance with WTO measures, violates the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, which holds that Member countries of the
WTO can only seek compensation under the rules and procedures
10 1
provided by the WTO and the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
"Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the
multilateral trade system of the WTO."'' 02 The U.S.'s unilateral action
"threatens the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade
system."' 10 3 The EC contends that the U.S. violated the Dispute
Settlement Understanding because it acted independently by continuing
the suspension of concessions that were authorized in July 1999, and,

94.

Id.

95.

Recourse to Arbitration, supra note 5, 9 39 (citing Dispute Settlement

39 (citing Dispute Settlement Understanding arts. 3.7, 21.1, 22.1, and 22.8).

Understanding arts. 3.7, 21.1, 22.1, and 22.8).
96. See Recourse to Arbitration, supra note 5,

39.

97. See id. 39. The Dispute Settlement Body's recommendation is the "first
objective and preferred solution." Id. (emphasis in original).
98. See EC Submission, supra note 21, TT 3,4,7.
99. See id. 3.
100. See id. 4-7.
101. See id. 9 27-31 (citing Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 23).
102. EC Submission, supra note 21, 31 (quoting Panel Report, United States-Import
Measures on Certain Productsfrom the European Communities, 6.14 WT/DS 165/R,
(July 17, 2000)).

103.

Id.
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04
therefore, sought to "redress unilaterally a perceived WTO violation."'
The U.S. followed WTO rules by remedying a violation in 1998,
and was awarded the right to impose tariffs as a result of the 1999 WTO
decision.10 5 The EC, however, asserts that the U.S. is unilaterally
seeking redress through retaliatory sanctions of a perceived WTO
violation. 0 6 The EC posits that its most recent directive should not be
subject to retaliatory sanctions even though it has the same consequences
as the initial directives. Although it has the same end result, the EC
changed the directive at issue by obtaining scientific data in support of its
claim. 10 7 The EC argues that its current directive adheres to the SPS
Agreement and WTO policy, and since U.S.0 8retaliatory sanctions have
not been lifted, the U.S. is acting unilaterally.
The EC concludes that if the U.S. determined that the EC was not
complying with WTO rules, the U.S. should have requested a WTO
09
hearing, as it did when it brought the initial dispute in the late 1990s.'
The EC continuously asserts that the U.S. is obligated by the Dispute
Settlement Understanding to terminate the retaliatory sanctions after the
directive found to be inconsistent with WTO policy was eliminated." 0
Although the EC does not state how it removed the inconsistent measure
in great detail, it states "that the presumption of good faith, of course,
also applies for implementing measures." 1
At a minimum, the EC claims that the U.S. violated at least one
article" 2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding because the U.S. has
not abolished the additional tariffs, though the directive found to be
inconsistent with WTO policy was removed." 13 The EC puts forth that
since it notified the WTO on September 22, 2003 that it achieved
compliance with the recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body in
14
the initial dispute, the suspension of concessions must be revoked."
The only information presented to the WTO and U.S. in the current
dispute filed by the EC regarding compliance of the recommendations
and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body in 1998 and 1999 was in

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
See
See
See
See

34.
id. f 41; see discussion supra Part II.
EC Submission, supra note 21, 42.
id.
144-146.
id.
49-51.

109.

See id. 51.

110.
111.

See id.
See id.

112.
113.
114.

Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 22.8.
See EC Submission, supra note 21, 133.
See id. See also European Union, Delegation of the European Commission to

73.
92.

the USA, EU Complies with WTO Ruling on Hormone Beef Calls on US and Canada to
Life Trade Sanctions, Oct. 15, 2003, http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2003/

2003061.htm.
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Directive 2003.115
Directive 2003 briefly explained the EC's acquiescence to the
recommendations and demonstrated what scientific data led it to reassert
that a proscription against oestradiol 173 was proper, and provisional
bans of the other disputed hormones 116 were similarly scientifically
justified.1 7 Acccording to an independent third party expert committee,
the Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public
Health ("SCVPH"), there is scientific validation for prohibiting those
hormones. 118
[T]he use of oestradiol 1703, with the aim of promoting growth, the
SCVPH assessment is that a substantial body of recent evidence
suggest that it has to be considered as a complete carcinogen, as it
exerts both tumour-initiating and tumour-promoting effects and that
the data currently available do not make it possible to give a
quantitative estimate of the risk.
As regards the other five hormones (testosterone, progesterone,
trenbolone acetate, zeranol and melengestrol acetate), the SCVPH
assessment is that, in spite of the individual toxicological and
epidemiological data available, which were taken into account, the
current state of knowledge does not make it possible to give a
quantitative estimate of the risk to consumers. 119
120
The EC affirms that it was a "comprehensive risk assessment."'

B.

The U.S. 's Argument

The U.S.'s assertion that it has not violated the Dispute Settlement
Understanding by maintaining retaliatory sanctions is based on the belief
that the EC has not complied with the Dispute Settlement Body's
115. See generally EC Submission, supra note 21 (noting lack of any substantial
specific reference to how the EC conducted its research and what scientific evidence
allows the EC to continue banning the hormones at issue while complying with WTO
rules).
116. Testosterone, progesterone, trenbolone acetate, zeranol, and melengestrol
acetate.
117. See European Union, supra note 114.
118. The Scientific Committee concluded this in 1999, and reaffirmed its decision in
2000 and 2002. See EC Submission, supra note 21,
143-144, (quoting Directive
2003/74/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003
amending Council Directive 96/22/EC concerning the prohibition on the use in
stockfarming of certain substances having a hormonal or thyrostatic action and of betaagonists,
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003L0074:EN:HTML (last visited Oct. 21, 2006)
[hereinafter Directive 2003]).
119. EC Submission, supra note 21, 144 (quoting Directive 2003, supra note 118).
120. See EC Submission, supra note 21, 145.
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recommendations and rulings from 1999.121 The U.S. contends that the
EC, as the complainant, has the burden of proof in alleging WTO rules
violations. 22 The U.S. avers that there is no evidence that the EC
removed the embargo at the center of the original dispute or that
subsequent amendments "provide[] a solution to the nullification or
impairment of benefits [to the U.S.]". 123 The U.S. quickly dismissed any
good faith argument relied upon by the EC. 124 The U.S. stressed that the
Dispute Settlement Understanding states that the Dispute Settlement
Body's role is to oversee the implementation of Members with policies
that are not in line with WTO rules conform to the Dispute Settlement
Body recommendations since concessions have been suspended. 125 The
U.S. asserts that the EC is incorrect in claiming that the suspension of
concessions could be removed without a Dispute Settlement 26
Body
concessions.1
of
suspension
the
of
withdrawal
authorizing
judgment
The U.S. attacks the EC's contentions that there should be a
presumption of conformity to WTO obligations 127 and leaves several
others unanswered positing instead that the EC's argument "fails to make
its prima facie case that the United States continues to suspend
concessions in breach of DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding]
Article 22.8. ' '128 In support of its argument, the U.S. pointed to Directive
2003.129 The U.S. avers that it is an anomaly that the EC had adequate
scientific information in the original proceeding to establish an outright
ban on certain hormones, 130 but now, after more research, there is
insufficient pertinent information-hence the most recent ban is only
provisional. 131
Furthermore, the U.S. acknowledged that the EC had not justified a
provisional ban because the Dispute Settlement Understanding has
specific requirements regarding provisional sanitary or phytosanitary
measures. 132 The U.S. concluded that more than sufficient scientific

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See generally U.S. Submission, supra note 4.
See id. 102.
Id. T 104.
See id. 106.
See id. 109.
See id.
See id. 116.
Seeid. 119.

129. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 121-122.
130. Progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone acetate, zeranol, and melengestrol.
131. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 7 121-122.
132. See id. TT 122-123. The U.S. asserts that a provisional ban requires the
following:
(1) [T]he measure is imposed in respect to a situation where "relevant scientific
evidence is insufficient.";
(2) the measure is adopted "on the basis of available pertinent information";
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133
evidence exists about the five provisional hormones at issue.
Accordingly, the U.S. reasoned, the import embargo is improper under a
provisional ban, and the most recent directive violates WTO rules and
policies. 34 Therefore, since the EC has not complied with WTO rules
and regulations, the EC has not removed its WTO inconsistent directive.

C. Third Parties
Although Canada is technically a third party 35 to the dispute
between the EC and the U.S., 136 Canada remains a strong proponent 1of
37
the American position because of Canada's on-going case with the EC.
Canada coordinated its argument with its North American neighbor to
"ensure that ...[their] positions are coordinated.'1 38 Canada states that
it will work closely with the U.S.' 39throughout the dispute for "close
cooperation and mutual assistance."'
Australia, 140

Brazil, 141

China, 142

Chinese

Taipei, 143

India, 144

(3) the Member which adopted the measure "seek[s] to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk"; and
(4) the Member which adopted the measure "review[s] the.., measure
accordingly within a reasonable period of time". [sic]
U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 123 (citation omitted).
133. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 124.
122-129. The U.S. reasserts that the panel in the original dispute told
134. See id.
the EC that the EC must base hormone bans on risk assessment. Id. 148.
135. Request to Join Consultations from Canada, United States-Continued
Suspension of Obligations, European Communities-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/2
(Nov. 22, 2004). A third party is a Member of the WTO who is not one of the parties to
the dispute, but who wants to be part of the settlement process because "it has a
substantial trade interest in consultations" and the "claim of substantial interest is wellfounded." Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 4.11. For rights of third
parties, see id. art. 10.
136. Technically, they are two different proceedings because Canada and the U.S.'s
dispute have different case numbers in the WTO. The U.S.'s number is WT/DS320,
while Canada's is WT/DS321. See World Trade Organization, Index of dispute issues,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/dispusubjectsindexe.htm#hormones,_m
eat (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
137. See id.
138. International Trade Canada, WTO Panel Cases to Which Canada is a Party-Canada-EU-Beef Hormones-An UPDATE, (Aug. 11, 2005), http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/update-hormones-en.asp.
139. Id.
140. See Request to Join Consultations from Australia, United States-Continued
Suspension of Obligations European Communities-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/4
(Nov. 22, 2004). See also World Trade Organization, United States-Continued
Suspension of Obligations European Communities-Hormones Dispute, Third Parties,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/cases e/ds320_e.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2006) [hereinafter Third Party Membership].
141. See Third Party Membership, supra note 140.
142. See id.
143. See id.
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Mexico, 145 New Zealand,14 6 and Norway 147 are also third parties to the
dispute. a 8 Australia, however, contends that the dispute should be
decided as a procedural event, 49 which bolsters the EC's view. Australia
claims that once a violating party alerts the retaliating party that it is now
in compliance, the latter must cease reprisal or initiate a WTO Panel
review for multilateral scrutiny.' 50 It would be inconsistent with WTO
policy for a party to bring its own measures up for examination because
that would "constitute[] an implicit unilateral determination of
inconsistency by the complainant and undermine[] the presumption that
Members act in good faith in taking action to comply with DSB [Dispute
Settlement Body] recommendations and rulings."'151
IV.
A.

Analysis
Should the WTO Examine the Issue as a ProceduralEvent or Should
the WTO Examine the EC's Compliance with the Dispute Settlement
Body's Recommendation?

Although it is the U.S.'s position that this case should focus on the
substantive issue of whether the EC removed the measure that was
inconsistent with WTO obligations, 52 the underlying issue in the current
dispute is how to determine whether a Member has complied with WTO
obligations. 153 Who determines if a Member has complied? Can a

144. See id.
145. Request to Join Consultations from Mexico, United States-Continued
Suspension of Obligations European Communities-Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/4
(Nov. 23, 2004). See also Third Party Membership, supra note 140.

146. See Third Party Membership, supra note 140.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. As opposed to substantive claims. The EC brought this dispute mainly for
compliance reasons, and NOT to make substantive claims that the inconsistent measure
has been removed. However, the U.S.'s argument predominantly focuses on the
substantive claim, namely that the EC's most recent provisional measure has not removed
the WTO inconsistent measure. Australia frames the issue to be decided as: "does the
DSU [Dispute Settlement Understanding] provide that a Member's announcement of its
compliance with DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] recommendations and rulings triggers
an obligation on a retaliating Member to either (i) cease retaliation or (ii) initiate a new
process for a multilateral determination of compliance." Third Party Submission of
Australia, United States-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones
Dispute, 4, WT/DS320 (Aug. 19, 2005), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/
negotiations/disputes/downloads/320 ec hormonessubmission.pdf
[hereinafter
Australia Submission].
150.

See id.

151.

Id. 6.

4-5.

152.

U.S. Submission, supra note 4,

153.

See EC Request for Consultations, supra note 16 (noting the EC request to the

7, 8, 9.
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Member fairly assess its own measures? Can a Member that is opposed
to the measure's result evaluate whether the disputed conduct complies
with WTO standards in a fair and just manner? The answers to all of
those inquiries culminate to determine the appropriate time-and
decision maker-for revocation of the suspension of concessions. Those
are all questions which need to be analyzed through the WTO dispute
settlement process. The flowchart of dispute settlement procedures
literally stops when the dispute arrives at the retaliation phase.' 54 The
155
procedural issue involving beef hormones is the EC's main argument.
Therefore, the Panel should not overlook who initiated the review and
the procedural issue.
1.

Has the U.S. Violated the Dispute Settlement Understanding?

a.

Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 23

The relevant article of the Dispute Settlement Understanding states
that Members seeking redress of a violation of obligations shall "not
make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that
benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any
objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through
recourse to dispute settlement ' in
accordance with the rules and
56
Understanding."'
this
of
procedures
The EC's argument that the U.S. violated this article because it
acted unilaterally when it determined that the EC's most recent measure
did not conform to WTO policy is potentially well founded. When the
U.S. initiated the original dispute in 1996,157 it brought the claim forward
in a manner that the Dispute Settlement Body could multilaterally assess
whether the EC violated WTO policy. 58 That action by the U.S.
demonstrated that the U.S. understood how the Dispute Settlement
Understanding functions in a conflict situation. The article is being
contested because it can work for or against
both members depending on
59
how the facts are applied to the article. 1
Panel was for primarily procedural issues, and focuses on the scientific issue behind
Directive 2003's self-assessed compliance determination).
154. Understandingthe WTO, supra note 10.
155. See EC Submission, supra note 21,
24.
156. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 23 (emphasis added).
157. See generally Panel Report, supra note 3.
158. Id.
159. Article 23 works in favor of the EC if it is determined that Directive 2003 is a
new measure; while the article works for the U.S. if it is deemed that Directive 2003 is
the same measure that the Dispute Settlement Body previously determined violated WTO
obligations. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, Article 23; see also
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Directive 2003 is a newer measure that is technically a separate ban
from the prior disputed measures. 60 Because this article applies to the
current situation,' 6 1 the U.S. infringed this WTO obligation when it
determined a violation occurred without consulting the Dispute
Settlement Body. 162 Although the U.S. alleges that this is the same
measure, 163 the EC notified the U.S. that ,Directive 2003 was a new
provisional guideline that complied with the SPS Agreement, 164 and
therefore, satisfied WTO obligations. 165 Once the EC implemented its
new measure, the U.S. had a duty to bring that measure to the Dispute
Settlement Body for multilateral review.' 66 Accordingly, only
then
67
would the U.S. be allowed to re-implement retaliatory sanctions.
b.

Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 22.8

Both the U.S. and EC agree that "Article 22.8 of the DSU [Dispute
Settlment Understanding] does not specify how the removal of the WTO
inconsistency is determined.', 168 Article 22.8 provides in relevant part
that:
The

suspension

of concessions

or

other

obligations

shall

be

EC Submission, supra note 21,
27-61; U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 9 165-202.
160. See Directive 2003, supra note 118.
161. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 23. See also EC
Request for Consultations, supra note 16.
162. The U.S. contends that it did not determine that a violation occurred because it
asserts that the Dispute Settlement Body found that a violation occurred in the original
dispute. The U.S. alleges that Directive 2003 is just a new name applied to the same
measure at issue in the original case. See EC Submission, supra note 21, T 19.
163. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4,
8, 31. U.S. Submission states that "the
amended' prohibition simply preserves the status quo of the EC's original hormone ban
by maintaining an import prohibition on meat and meat products from cattle treated with
the six hormones for growth promotion." See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 31.
164. See id. 16.
165. See EC Submission, supra note 21, $ 17. The EC would be in compliance with
WTO obligation because Directive 2003 fully adheres to the Dispute Settlement Body's
recommendations and rulings. Additionally, Directive 2003 is based on a comprehensive
risk assessment and only temporary in nature. Id.
166. A Member cannot determine if an infraction has occurred, only the Dispute
Settlement Body can reach such a conclusion. See Dispute Settlement Understanding,
supra note 12, art. 23.
167. Technically, the U.S. would not be re-implementing the retaliatory sanctions. It
might be considered a different reprisal because it is operable as a result of the
impairment suffered by the U.S. due to the most recent directive. However, if the
impairment were found to cause the same economic harm as the previous directive, then
the monetary amount allowed in retaliatory sanctions would remain the same. Therefore,
it would technically be a new suspension of concessions, but it would have the same
appearance as the previous suspension of concessions. See generally Dispute Settlement
Understanding, supra note 12, art. 22.
168. EC Submission, supra note 21, 85; see U.S. Submission, supra note 4, T 6.
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temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the measure
found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed,
or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings
provides a solution to the nullification or 69
impairment of benefits, or a
mutually satisfactorysolution is reached.1

Article 22.8, relating to Article 21.6, states that the "DSB [Dispute
Settlement Body] shall continue to keep under surveillance the
implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings, including those
cases where ...

concessions or other obligations have been suspended

but the recommendations to bring a new measure into conformity with
the covered agreements have not been implemented.' 70 It, however,
does not state or imply that it is the duty of the Dispute Settlement Body
to determine when the recommendations have been implemented.'17 The
Dispute Settlement Body cannot follow the EC throughout the process of
conforming to WTO obligations, which in this case requires either
abolishing the directives or conducting more research so that the
directives are supported by scientific methods respecting the SPS
Agreement. It is also noteworthy that while the majority of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding articles are not passive, Article 22.8 declares
that the "measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has
been removed.' 72 That language does not state who determines if the
measure has been removed.
Unfortunately, the Dispute Settlement Understanding has no text or
relevant analysis in other cases that is straightforward enough to
determine how the suspension of concessions ends when the violating
Member asserts that it is no longer in violation of WTO policies. 73 The
suspension of concessions permitted the U.S. to implement high tariffs

169. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 22.8 (emphasis added).
The remainder of Article 22.8 continues as follows:
[I]n accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 21, the DSB shall continue to keep
under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings,
including those cases where compensation has been provided or concessions or
other obligations have been suspended but the recommendations to bring a
measure into conformity with the covered agreements have not been
implemented.

Id.
170. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supranote 12, art. 22.8
171. See id. (noting the passive voice and lack of delegation to determine who decides
when conforming measures have been implemented).
172. Id.
173. See id.; see also EC Submission, supra note 21, 1 85; see also U.S. Submission,
supra note 4, 6; see also EC Request for Consultations, supra note 16; see also The
World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, the Panel
Process, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/disp2_e.htm (last visited
Sept. 11, 2006).
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on imported goods from the EC as a retaliatory sanction. 74 The text of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding duly acknowledges that
suspension of concessions is temporary and is to be used only as a last
75

resort. 1

The U.S. claims it has not breached Article 22.8 because the EC has
not removed the inconsistencies of the EC's ban and no solution of the
impairment of benefits to the U.S. has been attained. 176 The U.S.,
however, fails to realize that it is possible that the EC removed the
inconsistencies because additional scientific research was conducted and
proved that consuming hormone-treated products results in adverse
health effects. 177 The outcome could be the same negative impairment
on the U.S., 178 but the EC would comply with WTO obligations if more
179
scientific research were conducted.
The relevant language in the Dispute Settlement Understanding
allows problems to be solved by a mutually satisfactory conclusion.180 In
this current dispute, however, that is not a possibility because both
primary parties are uncompromising in their respective positions.' 8' The
U.S. believes it must only remove its retaliatory sanctions when there is 82a
multilateral decision that a Member conforms to WTO obligations,'
although it acknowledges that Members may resolve disputes
bilaterally. 83 The U.S. will not be able to make the EC accept that the
disputed hormones are healthy, 184 and the EC seems unwilling to allow
one or two hormones at issue into its markets.'8 5
The EC would rather have a provisional ban on the hormones and
conduct more research instead of allowing meats injected with hormones
into its markets until laboratory tests conclusively prove that the

174. See Recourse to Arbitration, supra note 5, T 13.
175. Seeid. 39.
176. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 104.
177. It is presumed that the U.S. failed to realize this because its brief did not account
for such a discrepancy. See generally id. Lack of argument that WTO consistent
legislation by the EC could have the same results on the U.S.
178. It would be plausible to have the same negative economic impairment on the
U.S. because the EC meat consuming market would still be closed to the American beef
export market even if the measure prohibiting hormone treated beef were in compliance
with WTO obligations.
179. Further research in line with the SPS Agreement would allow a provisional ban,
and therefore, would be consistent with WTO obligations.
180. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 22.8.
181. See generally U.S. Submission, supra note 4 and EC Submission, supra note 21
(noting that each is not willing to back away from their respective arguments).
182. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 113.
183. See id. at 31 n.120.
184. See generally EC Submission, supra note 21 (noting the EC's steadfast opinion).
185. See generally id. (noting its unwavering point of view on wanting all five
hormones banned provisionally).
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hormones have negative effects on humans.1 86 Similarly, the U.S. will
not yield to removing the retaliatory sanctions until its beef products are
allowed in the EC. 87 If the U.S. had eliminated its reprisals after the
EC's most recent directive was implemented, the U.S. could analyze the
new economic impairment. This new economic impairment could be
less than the previous economic impairment because of new export
88
markets, such as Japan, that are consuming large quantities of meat.'
The language of the Dispute Settlement Understanding also permits
removing the suspension of concessions when a Member finds a way to
stop the detriment to the impaired Member. 89 However, that option does
not apply in this case because 1the
new EC ban does not nullify the
90
impairment to the U.S. economy.
186. See generally Directive 2003, supra note 118 (inferring that if the EC did not
want to ensure that the hormones negatively affect humans, the EC would have repealed
its legislation completely).
187. See generally U.S. Submission, supra note 4 (inferring that if the U.S. wanted to
remove its retaliatory sanctions, it would have repealed them upon the EC's notification
of compliance).
188. See Reuters Press, New Rules for the U.S. Beef Market, Dec. 5, 2005, available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10339091/ [hereinafter Reuters]. Nearly one third of
U.S. beef exports ended up in Japan, making it the largest exportation market for beef.
Statistic is for 2003, the most recent available export year of beef to Japan. See id. New
markets could lower the amount of beef and beef byproducts available to export to the
EC. With fewer products available to export to the EC (assuming there was no ban on
American beef), the monetary amount by which the U.S. is impaired is lessened.
Although the U.S. implemented retaliatory sanctions in 1999 before Japan banned
American beef, the current argument prepared by the U.S. was written during a harsh
time for the American meat market, and could be a reason for such unwillingness by the
U.S. to remove sanctions. See Press Release, Sen. Allard Hails Reopening of Japanese
Market
to
U.S.-Produced
Beef
(Dec.
12,
2005),
available
at
http://allard.senate.gov/public/index.cfin?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressReleas
e_id=231560&Month= 12&Year=2005 [hereinafter Sen. Allard] (stating "[t]his is great
news for our export economy and Americas for beef producers."). Sen. Allard worked
for two years trying to allow U.S. beef into Japan. "Japan was the largest importer of
American Beef with imports totaling $1.7 billion in 2003." Id. See also Press Release,
Craig, Crapo Seek to Reopen Japanese Beef Market (Oct. 26, 2005), available at
http://craig.senate.gov/releases/pr102605a.cfm (stating that the ban has seriously harmed
Idaho beef producers. Japan's ban negatively affects the American beef industry and
farm economy). Beef exports to Japan were $1.7 billion before Japan banned American
beef, which is far greater than the impairment caused by the EC legislation.
Japan banned American beef for fear of the so-called Mad Cow Disease:
The United States has been prohibited from exporting beef to Japan since
December of 2003, when the Japanese forbid the importation of U.S. beef
following the discovery of a single case of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE), or Mad Cow Disease, here in the United States. Before the border
closure, Japan was largest importer of American Beef with imports totaling
$1.7 billion in 2003.
Sen. Allard, supra. Although this reason is different from the EC's motives for banning
American beef, it nonetheless means that it is not a viable market for U.S. beef exports.
189. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 22.8.
190. Although Directive 2003 is temporary, the provisional ban on U.S. hormone
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Therefore, to eliminate the temporary suspension of concessions,
the EC must demonstrate that the measure found to be inconsistent with a
covered agreement has been removed.1 9 1 For a successful EC claim in
this matter, it must continue demonstrating to the U.S. and the Dispute
Settlement Body, alike, that good faith plays a positive role in the dispute
settlement process.
2.

Good Faith is Vital

Should it matter that the Dispute Settlement Body never revoked its
authorization for the U.S. to have retaliatory sanctions? How much
weight in the dispute should be given to the EC's argument that it has
repealed the old directive that violated WTO obligations?
Although the WTO never specifically demanded that the U.S.
remove the retaliatory sanctions, the WTO also never explicitly granted
the U.S. permission to continue the suspension of concessions.192 The
Dispute Settlement Understanding clearly articulates that once a
violating Member conforms to WTO obligations, sanctions are no longer
allowed. 93 To determine which Member's perspective is the best in
deciding if a violating Member is now in compliance, the argument must
rest on good faith.
The question at issue remains: who decides if a Member has
complied with. WTO obligations and when does their decision occur?
The EC avers that it has implemented the Dispute Settlement Body
194
recommendations because it removed its old WTO inconsistent ban.
The EC replaced its old ban with a provisional ban that it asserts is
scientifically justified.' 95
Alternatively, the U.S.'s argument that it has not acted in violation

treated beef nonetheless means that the EC is not a realistic market for American beef
exports.

191. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 22.8. From a pure
textual standpoint, with the aforementioned two solutions ruled out in this case, in order
for the suspension of concession to be against WTO policy, the EC will have to prove
that the old inconsistent measure has been removed. See id.
192. Binding arbitration resulted in the level of suspension of concessions. However,
it granted only the suspension of concessions in the amount of $116.8 million per year.
See Recourse to Arbitration, supra note 5,
82-84. It did not specify for how many
years the suspension would last, or how it would be revoked. See id.
193. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 22.8.
194. See generally EC Submission, supra note 21 (implementing the Dispute
Settlement Body recommendations would mean that the EC eliminated the measure that
was inconsistent with WTO obligations. Therefore, removing the old directive that was
found to be against WTO obligations allowed the EC to be in compliance with WTO
obligations).

195.

EC Request for Consultations, supra note 16.
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of its WTO obligations by continuing retaliatory sanctions' 96 would be
very strong if the Dispute Settlement Body concludes that it is up to the
impaired Member to determine whether the violating Member has met
Dispute Settlement Body recommendations. If this occurs, the U.S.
arguably would not find that the EC has implemented Dispute Settlement
Body recommendations. That finding, however, would not solve the
problem of multilateral review of compliance 97 recommendations. The
U.S. also holds that the Dispute Settlement Body should determine
whether a violating Member has complied with Dispute Settlement Body
recommendations and rulings.198 If the U.S. were to decide whether the
EC implemented the Dispute Settlement Body recommendations, then
that would be a unilateral decision. Multilateral review would not occur
in the situation that the U.S. proposes, 199 because it would no longer be
the Dispute Settlement Body's determination if concessions can be
suspended. Instead, it would be the U.S. concluding that retaliatory
sanctions could still apply.200
The WTO's regulations for dispute settlement do not allow what the
U.S. refers to as the "negative consensus rule" 20 -a term describing
"Members found to have breached their obligations from avoiding the
consequences of their actions by blocking what would otherwise be the
consensus-based decision-making of the DSB [Dispute Settlement
Body]. 20 2 The U.S. jumps ahead to a sad conclusion by proposing that
the EC's position of Article 22.8 would allow violating Members to
block impaired Members from suspending concessions.2 3 The injured
Member would not be able to suspend concessions because the violating
Member would immediately allege that it was now in compliance. 2°
However, that is a conclusion showing that any remnant of good
faith is lacking in the system between Members, specifically the EC and
U.S. Ultimately, the U.S. will not be content with any resolution adopted
by the EC that limits American beef exports into the foreign markets.
196. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 9 1-10.
197. See id.
109. However, the U.S. is incorrect to say that Article 22.8 is
concerned with multilateral review of compliance. Literally, the article reads that it is
concerned with multilateral review of implementation of Dispute Settlement Body
recommendations, NOT of compliance. See Dispute Settlement Understanding,supra
note 12, art. 22.8.
198. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 109.
199. See id. 25-26.
200. It appears that the U.S. proposed that the impaired Member, here the U.S.,
should be the entity that determines when a previously violating Member has come into
compliance with its WTO obligations. See EC Submission, supra note 21,
4-5.
201. U.S. Submission, supra note 4, T 110.
202. Id.
203. See id. I11.
204. See id.
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Although the U.S. is at liberty to disagree with the EC's most recent
provisional ban, the former does not have to find it to be a suitable
solution. Upon implementation, the U.S. was free to bring the issue for
review to the WTO, and have a neutral third party review the measure
multilaterally.2 °5
If the EC were found to be in violation of WTO procedures, the
U.S. could then petition the WTO to grant it the ability to suspend
concessions.20 6 In that situation, the U.S. would likely have the same
retaliatory sanctions as the current ones because the new measure has the
same negative result on the U.S. economy.20 7 The U.S., however, should
not be permitted to avoid that step. The current U.S. proposal is that the
U.S. does not believe that the EC has made its prima facie case of
compliance with WTO obligations. 208
The U.S. independently
determined that it would continue implementing the retaliatory sanctions
"because that authorization has never been revoked".20 9
Making it mandatory for the U.S. to abide by the policy proposed by
the EC could strengthen the U.S.'s theory that the most recent measure
remains nonconforming. The WTO might become irritated if the EC
consistently implemented new measures that were not different from its
previous measures. WTO reaction to the EC's lack of good faith to try to
resolve its measure's compliance could be greatly unfavorable to the EC.
Not only would that be advantageous to the EC to have its most recent
measure reviewed multilaterally, but it would likely bolster the U.S.'s
reputation in the global environment. A multilateral review would be
favorable to the EC because after the WTO settles a dispute
multilaterally, other Members should be confident that the EC's directive
at issue truly adhered to WTO regulation, and it is more than just selfassessed compliance. The U.S. would then be perceived as the good-guy
who follows Dispute Settlement Understanding procedure, as opposed to
an intransigent bully who will not budge if it does not get its way.
The EC's proposal regarding a violating Member's determination of
self-compliance would not result in an "endless loop of litigation"210 if

205. The Dispute Settlement Understanding clearly states that if a Member is
concerned that another Member is in violation of a WTO policy, the former may bring a
claim. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 4.
206. Id. art 22.
207. It is irrelevant whether European markets are closed to U.S. beef exports if the
reason conforms to WTO obligations or not. If the market is closed to hormone treated
beef exports, economic impairment would be the same whether the markets are closed for
reasons that are with or without observance of WTO commitments.
208. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 119.
209. Id. at 2.
210. See id. 2,96.
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the Members applied it in good faith. 21 ' An endless loop of litigation
could occur just as easily if the impaired Member determined whether
the violating Member has complied with WTO obligations. In a situation
where an injured Member decided if a defaulting Member complied with
WTO obligations, unending litigation might occur in the scenario where
the former would consistently deny the latter's request to remove
sanctions. That would make it necessary for the violating Member to
bring the disagreement to the Dispute Settlement Body. The doctrine of
good faith provides a solution to the endless loop of litigation nightmare
because the Member's loss of credibility would not be worth the possible
gain. The EC's proposal of self-determined compliance would most
likely be used sporadically and in good faith.2 12
The Panel is likely to recognize the argument advocating the good
faith presumption. 2 13 The EC provides previous WTO decisions where
good faith was mentioned.21 4
Those Dispute Settlement Body's
decisions embody the element of good faith because they stated that
Members are:
"presumed to act in conformity with their WTO
obligations [;], 2 15 "Members of the WTO should not be assumed, in any
way, to have continued previous protection or discrimination through the
adoption of a new measure. This would come close to a presumption of
bad faith[;] ' '216 "where there has been a finding of non-compliance with
WTO rules and a Member adopted a replacement measure, that Member
cannot be assumed to have continued the previous prohibited
practice. ' ' 2 17 The EC further provides that "the presumption of good
faith, of course, also applies for implementing measures.' 218 The U.S.
responded to the EC's argument by presenting a single case, which
seems to not be completely on point with the issue in the current dispute,
stating:
[T]here is normally no presumption of inconsistency attached to a
Member's measures in the WTO dispute settlement system. At the

211. See id.
212. It would be used periodically because this situation only occurs when the
Dispute Settlement Body has determined that a Member was in violation of WTO
obligations and after the suspension of concession has been granted to the impaired
Member.
213. Multinational trade is based upon good faith.
See Dispute Settlement
Understanding, supra note 12, art. 3.10. Additionally, the EC offered previous WTO
decisions where the Dispute Settlement Body commented on the importance of good
faith. E.C Submission, supra note 21, 1 87-94.
214. E.C Submission, supra note 21,
87-94.
215. Id. T 88 (citation omitted).
216. Id. T 89 (citation omitted).
217. Id. 90 (citation omitted).
218. Id. 92.
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same time, we also are of the view that the failure, as of a given point
in time, of one Member to challenge another Member's measures
cannot be interpreted to create a presumption that the first Member
accepts the measures
of the other member as consistent with the
219
WTO Agreement.
The U.S. argues that this cited case "highlighted that there is simply no
basis in the WTO Agreement for the EC's argument that it is presumed
220
compliant with its obligations absent a finding against its measures.,
The U.S., albeit in a footnote in its submission, simply passed by the idea
that: "the EC appear[ed] to believe that the concept of good faith would
operate only in favor of the EC and either believe no other Member
would be able to avail itself to the concept of good faith, or ignores that it
would apply with respect to the United States."'221 That argument,
however, does not fully dismiss the good faith claim and solve the
current case. If the U.S. is acting in good faith, that still does not resolve
the problem of determining when a previously violating Member attained
compliance with WTO obligations. That issue would inevitably be
brought to the WTO. Although the U.S. makes an excellent point, it has
been the country with the power to continue implementing retaliatory
sanctions. Aside from initiating a review by the Dispute Settlement
Body, the EC is at the mercy of the U.S. to determine whether or not the
latter would remove its reprisal. Therefore, the presumption of good
faith should apply more to the previously violating Member because that
party is at the mercy of the Member imposing retaliatory sanctions to
resolve the dispute.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding specifically mentions good
faith in the body of the document, stating that "the use of the dispute
settlement procedures should not be intended or considered as
contentious acts and that, if a dispute arises, all Members will engage in
these procedures in good faith in an effort to resolve the dispute. 22 2
What remains to be decided is what degree of good faith the Panel will
recognize as satisfactory. It will be important for the Panel to determine
if a Member loses good faith credibility after that Member previously
violated a WTO policy. While Members should always act in good faith,
occasionally, a Member's ability to act in good faith may be
overshadowed by self-interest that it is too hard for the Member to see
that it lacks good faith. That situation, however, should be rare because
of the extreme negative effects of the result. If a Member were to bring a

219.
220.
221.
222.

U.S. Submission, supra note 4, 117 (citation omitted).
Id. 118.
Id. at 32, n. 124.
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 3.10 (emphasis added).
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cause of action to the Dispute Settlement Body and not observe good
faith because that Member were so intent on boosting its economic
situation, the Panel would be very disenchanted with that Member. Such
animosity toward the Member would not play favorably in subsequent
unrelated disputes. The WTO is an entity that should be respected, and
its policies should not be subservient to a Member's self-interest.
Time management 223 tends to favor the EC's position that the
violating Member who has repealed its WTO inconsistent measure
should be the one to determine if it has achieved compliance, and then
notify the impaired Member. The latter would have to remove its
retaliatory sanctions upon the former's compliance.22 4 If the impaired
Member observed there was not actual compliance with WTO
obligations, it could immediately notify the WTO and submit a request
for Panel consultations. 225 That would probably occur quickly because
the impaired Member would want to continue receiving the economic
benefits of the retaliatory sanctions. That process did not happen in this
26
case.

2

Because there is no regulation in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding governing the procedural path of dispute settlement after
a suspension of concessions has been granted,22 7 the EC waited over two
years after it announced plans to implement measures that it satisfied the
Dispute Settlement Body recommendations to have its claim reviewed
multilaterally.22 8 This delay is explained because the EC is still awaiting
the U.S.'s consideration of Directive 2003's compliance with WTO
obligations.22 9 0 Since the U.S. refused, the EC was forced to ask for a
23
WTO review.

a.
Self-assessed compliance would not violate the second
sentence of Article 22.8
Self-assessed compliance would not void the second sentence in
223. A timely resolution of problems is important to the WTO; "prompt settlement is
essential if the WTO is to function indefinitely." Understanding the WTO, supra note 10.
See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 3.3.
224. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supranote 12, art. 22.8.
225. See id. art. 4.
226. See EC Request for Consultations, supra note 16.
227. See The World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes,
The Panel Process, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/disp2_e.htm (last
visited Sept. 11, 2006).
228. See Directive 2003, supra note 118. Directive 2003, the vehicle through which
the EC asserted that it is in compliance with WTO policy, was "published and entered
into force on 14 October 2003." EC Request for Consultations, supra note 16.
229. Id.
230. Id.
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Article 22.8.231
Although the Dispute Settlement Body provides
surveillance during implementation 232 once a party complies with WTO
obligations the Dispute Settlement Body ceases to monitor
performance.233 The EC's proposed manner of solving the issue would
not violate the second sentence of Article 22.8 because the text implies
that once the Dispute Settlement Body recommendations are
implemented, the Dispute Settlement Body no longer monitors the
situation. 234 The Dispute Settlement Body can monitor a Member while
it tries to comply with the recommendations.23 5 It, however, would be
very difficult for the Dispute Settlement Body to pinpoint exactly when
that Member followed recommendations.
Implementing the recommendations would mean that the Member
technically has complied with WTO obligations.2 36 Either the impaired
Member or the violating Member in the dispute will have to be the one to
determine when the violating Member complies with WTO obligations.
If a Member does not believe that the violating Member has complied,
the former should then be free to request consultations from the Dispute
Settlement Body for multilateral review of the disputed measure.
B.

Should the U.S. Cease to Resent the EC and Repeal the Retaliatory
SanctionsAfter Six Years?

Meats injected with hormones are not only at issue in the EC, but
there is a growing demand for hormone-free organic meats in the U.S. as
well.23 7 Americans concede that there could be enough scientific
evidence in the upcoming years to show the negative effects caused by
the hormones at issue. 238 The U.S. is expending valuable time and
231. The second sentence of Article 22.8 states that:
In accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 21, the DSB shall continue to keep

under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings,
including those cases where compensation has been provided or concessions or
other obligations have been suspended but the recommendations to bring a

measure into conformity with the covered agreements have not been
implemented.
Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12, art. 22.8.
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. Article 22.8 implies that a Member complies with WTO obligations
when it implements Dispute Settlement Body recommendations. See id.
237. Joe Garner, For Many, Organic Beef a Natural Selection; Growing Segment of
Market Finds it's What'sfor Dinner, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Jan. 13, 2006, at

A18. Organic meat does not contain growth hormones. Id.
238.

Debra Gordon-Hellman, Editorial, Fight Cancer with Prevention, BIRMINGHAM

NEWS, Dec. 25, 2005, at 2B, proposing that there needs to be more research into
genetically modified food to determine if consuming products with the hormones are
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resources on sanctions on the European market while only collecting
pennies for the punishment. 239 Approximately $116.8 million is not
sufficient compensation for the U.S. when compared to the animosity it
is breeding with the EC. The U.S. should think twice before
' 240
antagonizing "one of the United States' strongest strategic partners
with the retaliatory sanctions.
Because this current dispute is open for public viewing, 24 1 the U.S.
may not want to back down from its position. U.S. concessions could
demonstrate that the U.S. is willing to walk away from some issues that
are economically insignificant. The U.S. may not want to establish a
precedent of giving up on disputes and withdrawing retaliatory sanctions.
This could be a slippery slope for the U.S. 24 2 It would be best for the
U.S. to comply with the recommendations this current Panel will find. If
the Panel holds in favor of the EC's position that a Member's compliance
is determined by a good-faith self-assessment, the U.S. would be
encouraged to remove the retaliatory sanctions for a few years until the
expiration of the provisional ban. From there, the U.S. could wait to see
what new EC measures are implemented. Then, if the U.S. determines
the subsequent EC directives violate WTO obligations, the U.S. would
be free to request a hearing before the WTO.
V.

Future Implications

The U.S. recognizes that particular procedures in post-suspension of
concession situations do not currently exist in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. 243 Panels are not allowed to legislate; 244 they may only
apply the agreements written in the text of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding itself.245 It is within the Panel's discretion, however, to

interpret the agreements written in the text of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding,246 which could permit the Panel to decide the issue of
linked to cancer.
239. The U.S. imposes sanctions of up to $116.8 million per year. Recourse to
Arbitration, supra note 5,
83-84.
240. European Union Profile, STATES NEWS SERV., Oct. 4, 2005.
241. See Communication from the Chairman of the Panels, United States-Continued
Suspension of Obligations in the European Communities-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS/320/8 (Aug. 2, 2005).
242. If the U.S. withdrew from this issue, other countries could try to take advantage
of the U.S. by implementing measures that might not greatly affect the U.S. economy, but
nonetheless contravene WTO principles.
243. See U.S. Submission, supra note 4, at 169.
244. See id. 169.
245. See id.
246. See id. The U.S. states that "[p]anels however are not authorized to legislate, but
rather are to apply the covered agreements as written, not as one party would like them to
be written." Id.
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procedure in post-suspension of concession situations. That problem is
of great importance to resolve. Whatever the outcome of this current
dispute, it will no doubt have an effect on possible changes in the text of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
This is an on-going battle for all the parties, and the issue is brought
247
forth to the public's attention for the first time in the WTO setting.
This awareness will most likely attract more people to the underlying
hormones issue, which could make the dispute even more provocative.
Transparency in this proceeding will make it a key proceeding to
follow, as all observers for WTO policies will recognize this
monumental decision to waive secrecy in the WTO. The previous
closed-door policy "provide[s] fodder for legitimate criticisms of the
WTO.",248 Transparency in WTO proceedings could make skeptics of the
WTO's legitimacy compel Members involved in disputes to comply with
WTO obligations and Dispute Settlement Body recommendations even
more quickly than they are today. An open-door policy could strengthen
world trade and pressure Members to resolve disagreements more
quickly. The EC, in its oral statement to the Panel, duly noted that the
prospect for transparency "will change nothing about the
intergovernmental

nature of the WTO.,

249

The EC reiterated the

importance of transparency by stating that the opportunity of the public
to see the WTO in action:
[M]ay help against the misperceptions that exist in civil society
regarding WTO dispute settlement ... in particular of the doubts that

have been voiced about the unbiased, proper and fair manner in
which panels conduct these trade dispute. Today, the public can see
with its own eyes that WTO panelists are highly professional,
the parties a full
impartial and objective, and that they
250 accord
opportunity to present their positions.
Third party opinions could be crucial to the outcome of this
dispute.251 The procedural post-suspension of concessions posture is a
247.

Frances Williams, WTO Opens Hearing to Public, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept.

13, 2005, at 10.
248. Editorials, The FirstPeek at the WTO, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at A20.
249. Oral Statement by the European Communities in the First Substantive Meeting,
United States-Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute,
WT/DS320,
2, (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2005/october/tradoc_125515.pdf.

250. Id.
251. Third parties have rights. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 12,
art. 10. Furthermore, articles 10.1 and 10.2 demonstrate that the input from third parties
who have a "substantial interest" in the dispute before a panel will be taken into account.
Id. That may influence the panel's opinion as well as illustrate that third party outlook,
inputs, and values are important to the WTO in settling disputes. That adds even more to
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new area that might result in new legislation. Hence, the WTO made the
correct decision when it showed a strong interest in third party opinions.
Canada, the major third party in this dispute, 252 is important because it
contributes and bolsters the U.S.'s position.253 The U.S., standing alone,
provides a strong argument, but its weakness is that its outlook is the
view of only one country. Meanwhile, the EC can be seen as compiling
the support of its twenty-five members. 4 Canada not only provides the
U.S. with support,255 it also inadvertently adds another important factor
to the U.S.'s position-namely that another country is advocating what
some might perceive as the opinion of a single stubborn country.
China, Australia, and Brazil's views on the matter are very
important to the WTO because the Panel requested each third party
member to comment on China and Australia's positions.256 The Panel
specifically asked China and Brazil to further explain their
interpretations of suspension of concessions.257 That request illustrated
that the WTO is trying to fully understand those countries' perspectives.
Therefore, the WTO decision remains undecided.
It is significant that Australia addresses the current issue as a
procedural matter more in favor of the EC's argument of good faith and
the procedural matter that follows the implementation of new
measures. 258
From a self-interest standpoint, a country such as
Australia 259 would mostly prefer to have limited prohibitions on
exportation of meats for pure economic interest. Thus, Australia, a large
exporter of beef products,26 ° strongly supports the EC's procedural
proposal. 261 This advocacy demonstrates that countries that could be

credibility of multilateral review.
252. See International Trade Canada, WTO Panel Cases to Which Canada is a
Party-Canada-EU-Beef Hormones-An
UPDATE,
(Aug.
11,
2005),
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/update-hormones-en.asp.
253. Id.
254. The European Union is composed of twenty-five nations. See Warren Giles,
WTO Opens Hearings on Modified Meat to the Public, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 13, 2005, at

C07.
255. See International Trade Canada, WTO Panel Cases to Which Canada is a
Party-Canada-EU-Beef Hormones-An
UPDA TE,
(Aug.
11,
2005),
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/update-hormones-en.asp.
256. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs, Panel Questions to Third
Parties,
(Aug.
19,
2005),
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/disputes/
320_32 lpanelquestions_ 190905.html.
257. See id.
258. See Australia Submission, supra note 149, 4.
259. Australia is a major exporter of beef; its exports supply half of the Japanese beef
market. See Japan Lifts US and CanadianBeef Ban, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Dec. 15, 2005,
availableat 2005 WLNR 20081929.
260. See id.
261. See Australia Submission, supra note 149, $ 4.
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economically affected in a negative manner by the hormone ban support
the EC's self-assessment determination and good faith arguments in the
WTO dispute setting.
VI. Conclusion
The underlying beef hormone dispute has been an issue between the
U.S. and EC for years.262 Although the goal of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding is to provide solutions to quarreling Members in a
relatively short period, this dispute was not resolved in a timely fashion.
If good faith does not play a role in determining whether a Member
complies with WTO policy in a post-suspension of concessions dispute,
that Member will be punished for future legislation that possibly adheres
to WTO mandates. An impaired Member should not be able to reap the
economic benefits of continuing the application of retaliatory sanctions
against the previously violating Member when the latter asserts it is now
in compliance.
An impaired Member will not be satisfied with a violating
Member's conformity unless such acquiescence wholly favors the
impaired Member. This will likely never occur. The impaired Member
will always want to wait for the other Member to implement a more
favorable policy. Ultimately, the only way to expedite the process in a
post-suspension of concessions phase is to trust that the previously
violating Member acts in good faith when it asserts it is in compliance
with WTO policy. Although this case has taken years to resolve,
hopefully the Dispute Settlement Body will decide what amendments to
the Dispute Settlement Understanding during this disagreement are
necessary. Ultimately, a decision regarding who determines when a
violating Member conforms and complies with WTO policy is overdue.

262. The dispute over beef hormones between the U.S. and EC has fostered animosity
at least as long as the initial request for consultations of the Dispute Settlement Body in
January of 1996, if not longer. See Request for Consultations by the United States,
European Communities-Measures concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),

WT/DS26/1 (Jan. 26, 1996).

